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Growing government surpluses, a ballooning trade deficit, and the resulting growth in
private sector debt have placed the U.S. economy in a precarious position. We agree with
President George W. Bush that fiscal stimulus is necessary to reinvigorate the economy; in
the current economic environment, monetary policy will not work. However, a tax cut that
would adequately stave off a downturn needs to be substantially larger than that proposed
by the president. 
THE EVIDENCE OF AN ECONOMIC SLOWDOWN (discussed below) is becoming ever more pronounced, making it easier for
economists and policymakers alike to begin to discuss openly the real possibility of recession. President Bush has suggested that
the possibility of a "hard landing" only strengthens his campaign pledge for a broad-based tax cut. However, many economists, as
well as policymakers in the outgoing Clinton administration, have criticized his proposal for two reasons: first, many deny that the
economy has entered a downturn, and chide the new president for "talking down" the economy. Second, and more important, they
argue that if a hard landing is upon us, it is the job of the Fed to avert it. Treasury Secretary Paul H. O'Neill has argued that the Fed
should be the "first line of action" and has downplayed the importance of tax cuts to stimulate the economy (Kahn 2001). Earlier,
columnist Bruce Bartlett argued similarly that although a tax cut is a good idea, recession or not, "Mr. Bush should not argue that
his tax cut will save the economy from a recession" (Bartlett 2000). Bartlett's main argument was that monetary policy works with
a much shorter lag than does fiscal stimulus in the form of tax cuts. Echoing the consensus, Fred Bergsten of the Institute for
International Economics forcefully argued that Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan will be able to handle "whatever
stimulus the economy turns out to need," and went on to state that America cannot "afford" President Bush's tax cuts (Bergsten
2001). Thus, the main objections to the president's proposal are that monetary policy alone should be able to prevent a hard
landing, that fiscal policy operates with long lags, and that tax cuts imperil the budget, which posted a surplus only after a long
struggle to impose fiscal discipline. 
In this note we present a case for implementing stimulative fiscal policy rather than interest rate
reductions by the Fed. We conclude that those who oppose the use of fiscal policy may not appreciate
the strength of the forces moving the U.S. economy toward recession. Further, we fear that relying
solely on monetary policy this early in the downturn will virtually ensure a severe recession. Finally,
we evaluate President Bush's tax cut plan and conclude that it is too small to stimulate the economy
enough to prevent a recession. We estimate that the required fiscal stimulus is on the order of at least
$450 billion annually, which would shift the federal budget stance from a surplus of more than 2
percent of GDP to a deficit of 2.5 percent of GDP. We explain why a budget deficit is economically
sound at this time, and why attempts to maintain "fiscal discipline" and a budget surplus are
particularly dangerous in this first year of the new millennium. In light of our analysis, we propose a tax
cut package that is likely to provide the stimulus needed to cushion the downturn. 
If this discretionary adjustment to the existing fiscal policy stance is not made, the federal budget will automatically move to deficit
as economic growth turns negative, household income falls, and unemployment explodes to double digits, because tax revenues
will automatically fall and spending on unemployment compensation and other social programs (welfare, crime, food stamps) will
rise. 
Evidence That the Economy Has Slowed 
This recession has been a long time in coming. We and other Levy Institute scholars have already made the argument that the
Clinton-era expansion was based on highly unsustainable processes and that the newly achieved federal budget surplus would
depress economic growth (Papadimitriou and Wray 1998; Godley and Wray 1999; Wray 1999b, 2000; Godley 2000). Admittedly,
when one consistently predicts a recession, one eventually gets it right. We wish to emphasize, however, that the unsustainable
processes upon which the expansion was based increased the likelihood of a deep recession the longer the expansion proceeded.
In other words, the longer the expansion lasted, the greater the chances that the downturn would be worse than it might have been
had it occurred a couple of years ago. This is because the expansion was based on unprecedented deficit spending by the private
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toward recession. sector, which has drowned households in red ink. As soon as the private sector stopped borrowing to fuel spending in excess of
income, the expansion came to an end. The decline in income and employment that marks a recession will make it difficult for
households (and firms) to service debt accumulated over the expansion, a situation that will continue to depress spending and
discourage renewed borrowing for years to come. This is a primary consideration in our argument that monetary policy alone
cannot provide adequate stimulus. Further, suggesting that the Fed can keep the expansion going by lowering interest rates alone
is misguided at best, as it necessarily implies that the private sector would have to increase its debt beyond the record levels already
achieved. 
This slowdown appears to be sharper than that of any recent recession. Let's look at the evidence. The following events occurred
between the second and third quarters of 2000: 
Real GDP growth slowed from 5.6 percent to 2.2 percent. 
Nominal GDP growth dropped by more than half, from 8.2 percent to 3.8 percent. 
Real, nonresidential, fixed investment fell by nearly half. 
Further, more recent evidence shows that the speed of the slowdown picked up during the fourth quarter. The consumer
confidence index fell from 128.6 in December to 114.4 in January, its lowest level since December 1996 (The Conference Board
2001). Declining confidence, no doubt, contributed to disappointing Christmas sales: December retail sales were up just 0.1 percent
over November, and fourth quarter sales were the worst since 1990, when the economy was mired in recession. Auto sales fell by 8
percent in December. The National Association of Purchasing Management (NAPM) index of manufacturing sector activity fell to
43.7, its lowest level since the last recession. Excluding energy output, which was boosted by cold weather, output of consumer
goods (durable and nondurable) is down significantly. As the Fed's January 17, 2001 Beige Book Summary documents, during
December, "despite heavy discounting, nearly all districts reported lackluster retail sales," "manufacturing activity weakened in all
districts," "residential real estate activity cooled in most districts," and "there were signs of slowing in commercial real estate activity
in some districts" (www.federalreserve.gov/fomc/beigebook/2001). Every day, another handful of top corporations warns that
earnings will fall short of expectations. The Dow Jones Industrial Average recorded its worst year since 1981, while the S&P 500
posted its worst annual performance since 1974. As of Christmas, the NASDAQ was down by half just since September, recording
its worst year ever (Berenson 2000). While the data are not uniformly bad (and no one would expect them to be so, even in the
midst of a recession), the evidence is now quite strong that 2001 will be a year of recession. 
Causes of the Downturn 
Many commentators attribute the current downturn to the six rate hikes totaling 175 basis points imposed by the Fed between
summer 1999 and summer 2000. These hikes were thought to be necessary because of the "unsustainable" nature of the boom,
which was said to be so robust that it would cause inflation. While the boom was indeed unsustainable, we view the nature of that
unsustainability in a much different light. The problem was not inflation, but rather, certain unsustainable processes that were
analyzed by the Levy Institute's Wynne Godley in 1999. For our purposes, three main factors generated the slowdown. First,
growing government surpluses, driven by the obsession with a balanced federal budget, reduced private sector disposable income
and wealth. Second, the ballooning U.S. trade deficit similarly has reduced American income and wealth and continues to do so.
Third, these two factors together necessarily imply that economic growth could take place only if the private sector spent in excess
of its income, financed by an ever-growing mountain of debt. In other words, the expansion was in doubt irrespective of Fed
policy, although the interest rate hikes may have hastened the inevitable by increasing the cost of servicing debt. As soon as the
debt service burden (the percentage of disposable personal income required to pay interest and principal on debt) reached 14
percent, households began to cut back on borrowing. 
By accounting identity, when the public (government) sector runs a surplus, the private sector must run a corresponding deficit. It
does so by reducing its net holdings of domestic nominal wealth by selling government bonds. By the same logic, when the trade
balance is in deficit, U.S. holdings of net international wealth must decline. While it is widely recognized that 20 years of U.S. trade
deficits have transformed the country from the world's largest creditor nation to the world's largest debtor, it is not as widely
acknowledged that government budget surpluses necessarily reduce private sector net wealth in a manner similar to that in which
trade deficits reduce domestic private sector wealth. Thus, the trade deficit and the budget surplus combined to greatly reduce U.S.
private sector income and wealth. Although these reductions in net (domestic and international) wealth and disposable income
made it impossible for the private sector to continue to spend without increasing its net indebtedness, lenders, taking note of this
growing indebtedness and rising leverage of prospective net income flows, began to tighten credit, resulting in what some are
already beginning to call a "credit crunch": total U.S. credit grew at a 9.5 percent annual rate in 1999, but fell to 6.8 percent by the
second quarter of 2000 and to 5.8 percent in the third quarter (D'Arista 2001). At the aggregate level, a credit crunch can only
make matters worse, because if the private sector cannot increase its borrowing, it will not be able to increase its spending. If
economic growth subsides, credit quality will be further eroded, leading to further credit tightening. Hence, the credit crunch and
the spending slowdown are connected in a reinforcing manner. While maintenance of easy credit could perhaps postpone the day
of reckoning, the unsustainable processes in place increase the likelihood of a hard landing. 
The problem, then, was not excessive growth, but rather, the presence of the large and growing "sibling" surpluses (that is, the
foreign sector surplus--our trade deficit--and the budget surplus). Together, these surpluses required ever-rising private, domestic
deficits that were unsustainable. Household spending was already slowing during the second quarter, so that growth was primarily
driven by high investment. This, however, could not continue for long, as falling capacity utilization rates caused firms to rethink
their capital needs. According to the Financial Markets Center, households and nonprofit organizations saw their net liabilities rise
over the course of the expansion, from an annual increase of just over $300 billion in 1994 to nearly $400 billion in 1997 and $627
billion in 1999. In the first quarter of 2000, households increased liabilities at an annual rate of nearly $800 billion; this collapsed to
less than $590 billion in the second quarter and to $569 billion in the third. Similarly, business borrowing slumped sharply: new
corporate borrowing from banks fell from $150 billion in the second quarter of 2000 to just $22.5 billion in the third. As many
commentators have noted, the equity market boom of the mid 1990s fueled much of the borrowing: as households felt "wealthier,"they were more willing to borrow to finance consumption; similarly, firms borrowed to buy stock. This impetus ended with the
collapse of the stock market boom, however. Since March 2000, over $2.5 trillion of stock market wealth has disappeared; when
this loss is added to the burden of the mountainous debt accumulated over the expansion, it is not surprising that both households
and business have decided to slash borrowing and spending. 
Policy Implications 
In order to allow the private sector to bring spending more closely in line with its income and avert a severe downturn, the
government's budget stance must be changed significantly and immediately. If the household sector, which is responsible for most
of the private sector deficit, were to balance its budget in the first quarter of 2001, holding GDP growth constant would require the
federal budget stance to change by 6.5 percent of GDP, from surpluses of more than 2 percent of GDP to deficits of 4.5 percent. 
Unless the economies of the rest of the world slow even faster than that of the United States, the trade deficit is likely to fall as
households reduce their purchases of imported goods and services. Further, slower growth will reduce the size of state and local
government surpluses (by lowering tax receipts and increasing social spending) that are draining private sector income. Thus, it is
likely that the private sector's deficits will be reduced automatically as imports fall and state and local government surpluses
decline. If this does occur, the size of the required fiscal adjustment would be smaller than 6.5 percent, meaning that a federal
budget deficit somewhat smaller than 4.5 percent of GDP might stabilize GDP. Offsetting this, however, is the probability that a
substantial portion of tax cuts will be "saved" or used to retire debt, implying that a larger tax cut will be required to produce the
necessary stimulus. Using his model of the U.S. economy, Godley has considered various scenarios and found that a tax cut of at
least 4.5 percent of GDP is likely to be required (Godley 2001). For the purposes of our analysis, we will presume a conservatively
estimated target--namely, for a federal government deficit of 2.5 percent of GDP annually. If growth continues to be negative, the
federal budget deficit target should be increased. 
President Bush has proposed tax cuts totaling $1.3 trillion over the next 10 years. (Some current estimates place the cost of the
proposal at $1.6 trillion.) During the election campaign, he suggested that these cuts would be heavily "back-loaded," that is, most
of the tax reductions would occur toward the end of the 10-year period. Indeed, the start-up date was pushed back from 2001 to
2002, with only a $21 billion tax cut proposed for 2002. As evidence of recession accumulated, however, President Bush proposed
to "front-load" at least some of these cuts (Stevenson 2001). Precise details have not been forthcoming, but it appears unlikely that
when a concrete proposal is made the tax cuts would total more than $150 billion per year. Even if implemented immediately, a
budget surplus of more than half a percent of GDP would remain. In order to attain the required deficit of 2.5 percent of GDP, tax
cuts of another $300 billion would be required immediately. 
According to President Bush's campaign platform (www.georgewbush.com/issues/taxes.html), he favors a tax cut that would do
the following: 
Trust people. He believes all taxpayers should be allowed to keep more of their own money. 
Lower the record-high tax burden. Federal taxes are the highest they have ever been during peacetime: On average,
Americans work more than four months a year to fund the operations of government at all levels. 
Cut marginal rates. As President Reagan demonstrated, the best way to encourage economic growth is to cut marginal tax
rates across all tax brackets. 
Increase access to the middle class. Under current tax law, low-income workers often pay the highest marginal rates. For
example, a single waitress supporting two children on an income of $22,000 faces a higher marginal tax rate than does a
lawyer making $220,000. 
In 1998, 40 percent of the income tax was paid by the 1.6 percent of tax returns on which reported incomes were above $200,000
(Samuelson 2001). While a candidate, President Bush proposed to reduce marginal tax rates from today's 15, 28, 31, and 36 percent
to 10, 15, 25, and 33 percent. This marginal rate reduction would put most of the dollars resulting from the tax cut into the hands of
high-income taxpayers, for the simple reason that they pay the majority of the total tax dollars collected. In addition, he proposed
to increase the child tax credit, which would benefit taxpayers with children. We support the proposal made when he was a
candidate, but we urge President Bush to accelerate the phasing in of his proposal. The marginal rate reduction will help to offset
some of the losses suffered by high-income earners as the stock market faltered and to relieve some of their burden of indebtedness.
In addition, it is critical to increase tax relief for middle- and low-income earners. President Bush's proposed $150 billion annual tax
cut is only one-third of the tax relief we foresee as necessary. To achieve the additional $300 billion of tax relief needed, we favor
an immediate reduction in payroll taxes, of up to $150 billion, that would heavily favor working Americans and the firms that
employ them. 
There are very good reasons to cut payroll taxes. Economists have long recognized that such taxes are
regressive; indeed, for most lower-income households, they are more burdensome than the income tax.
Further, payroll taxes are specifically levied on income derived from work, and thus, in the view of
some economists, provide a powerful disincentive to employment because they raise the costs to
employers of creating new jobs and discourage people from working. Payroll taxes make American
labor relatively more expensive than labor abroad, thereby encouraging investors to locate plants and
equipment outside the United States (U.S. Trade Deficit Review Commission 2000) and contributing
to the trade deficit. Payroll taxes are inflationary because they increase the cost of production. They
distort the market mechanism by raising the costs of labor relative to the costs of capital. Cutting
payroll taxes is easy to understand and administer. Moreover, such an action has an immediate impact
by increasing take-home pay from the moment the cut is implemented, thus benefiting workers and
businesses of all types. 
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the phasing in of his
proposal.There is an additional important consideration. Since the primary goal of the tax cut is to raise private demand for the nation's
output, the ideal tax cut should put more disposable income into the hands of families who will then increase consumption (and,
possibly, spending on residential and nonresidential investment). It is generally accepted by economists that the likelihood of a
household's doing so varies inversely with income; thus, a tax cut that favors lower-income households should have a larger impact
on consumption than would one that favors high-income households. 
To some extent, this proposal goes against the grain. Some will object that a surplus must be sustained in the Social Security Trust
Funds in order to deal with future retiring baby boomers. Indeed, most of the federal budget surplus can be attributed to the huge
surplus in Social Security funds: about 90 percent of the surplus achieved to date is off budget, most in the Social Security
program. Over the past two years there has been a great deal of discussion about the surplus said to be accumulating in the trust
funds. These, however, merely represent one branch of the federal government holding IOUs against another branch; they cannot
help provide for retiring baby boomers in the future (Papadimitriou and Wray 1999). Milton Friedman (1999) has argued that
"taxes paid by today's workers are used to pay today's retirees . . . When [current] benefits that are due exceed [current] proceeds
from payroll taxes, as they will in the not-very-distant future, the difference will have to be financed by raising taxes, borrowing,
creating money or reducing other government spending. And that is true no matter how large the 'trust fund.'" There is no way,
then, to "lock away" payroll tax receipts for future use. Friedman calls it an "insurance fiction," and the late Herbert Stein
humorously recommended in 1999 that Social Security be "saved" simply by issuing $10 trillion in Treasury securities at
once--without waiting for Social Security to amass any surpluses. Nor does elimination of the trust funds entail any financial risk to
the government's future ability to pay Social Security benefits as they come due. Indeed, this ability is not at all dependent on
current tax revenue, so there is no reason to try to preserve budget surpluses in the Social Security program. (For more detail, see
Papadimitriou and Wray 1999; Wray 1999a; and Bell and Wray 2000.) 
How large should the payroll tax cut be? To return the OASDI portion (the "retirement" and disability
insurance part) of the Social Security program to balance, a cut on the order of $150 billion would be
required. If this were apportioned equally between employers and employees, workers would receive a
direct benefit of $75 billion annually. The equivalent reduction to employers would decrease costs
borne by firms and thereby reduce the incentive for layoffs and downsizing. This tax cut would be in
addition to President Bush's proposal to cut marginal income tax rates, and is consistent with the
desired characteristics of a tax cut as stated by Bush during his campaign; that is, it would generate
significant tax relief for low-income earners struggling to reach the middle class, provide a powerful
incentive to work, generate economic growth, and spur consumption spending by increasing the
disposable income of those with a high propensity to consume. 
Together with the president's proposal to cut marginal income tax rates, this payroll tax reduction will
achieve $300 billion of the $450 billion fiscal adjustment that we estimate is necessary to stave off
recession. This means that another $150 billion in tax cuts is still required. In keeping with the discussion above, these cuts should
be designed to increase spending, relieve debt burdens, and distribute most of the benefits to working households. This could be
accomplished, for example, through increases to the earned income tax credit (EITC), which currently totals about $30 billion.
Doubling the EITC by increasing payments and broadening coverage would add another $30 billion of stimulus. This would target
the tax cut to the lowest-income households and significantly increase the rewards to work (Bluestone and Ghilarducci 1996). Tax
credits for educational expenses might also make college more affordable and are in keeping with President Bush's priorities, while
tax credits for child care would help working families. Some within Washington are currently floating the idea of a temporary
emergency tax refund of $250 per taxpayer, for a total of about $44 billion. The advantage of such a proposal is that it could be
made retroactive to tax year 2000. 
We would also favor substantial spending increases for education, public infrastructure, child care, and health care for those with
inadequate coverage. However, it may be politically more difficult to pass spending initiatives, and the lag time involved in
boosting aggregate demand might be longer than that required for a tax cut. Some of the tax cuts we have discussed might be
made temporary--say, for three to five years--which would buy time to allow Congress and the president to find desirable
alternative spending increases. 
Conclusion 
Substantial evidence already exists that the economy is moving toward a hard landing. The federal budget has become so biased
toward surplus that automatic stabilizers cannot be counted upon to cushion the downturn. The first reaction of economists and
policymakers has been to turn to the Fed to ask for interest rate reductions. In order for monetary policy to prevent a recession,
however, lower rates would have to stimulate private sector borrowing. But, as we have argued, the private sector fueled the
Clinton boom by creating unsustainable deficits--indeed, as soon as it stopped increasing its borrowing, the boom was doomed. It
would be misguided to recommend that the Fed try to induce the private sector to reembark on a fundamentally unsustainable
borrowing frenzy. It makes more sense to consider the underlying cause: the extremely tight fiscal policy that has been sucking
private income and wealth from the economy. Hence, the solution is to rectify the fiscal imbalance. 
Unfortunately, some observers--even those who see a recession coming--do not recognize that the fiscal imbalance is the main
problem to be solved. The budget has become structurally biased toward running surpluses even with low or no growth, although
it should be biased toward running cyclical deficits when the economy slows and running surpluses only during periods of high
growth. Although the performance of the economy over the past decade has been stellar, the cause and effect should not be
confused: the federal budget surplus was not the cause of the expansion; indeed, in conjunction with a trade deficit, the surplus
ensured the doom of the Goldilocks economy. Thus, rather than maintaining a structural budget surplus, the budget ought to move










borrowing frenzy. In summary, to prevent the economy from sliding into recession, an immediate tax cut of approximately $450 billion will be required
during the next year. President Bush's current plan would cut taxes by as much as $150 billion during that period. We recommend
an additional $150 billion tax cut in the form of a reduction in the payroll tax and another $150 billion cut to be achieved through
an expansion of the EITC, retroactive tax refunds, and provision of tax credits for educational spending, child care, or similar
activities. 
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